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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
JEFFERY GLORIOSO, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 900170-CA 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from the conviction of possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-37-
8(2)(b). This court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3-(g). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Trial Court properly ruled that Trooper 
Mangleson had reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop 
appellant's vehicle. 
2. Whether scope of the detention was reasonably related to 
circumstances which gave rise to the initial intereference. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND RULES 
The rules and statutes relevant to a determination of this 
case are: 
Utah Code Annotated Section 77-7-15: 
Any peace officer may stop any person in a public place 
when he has reasonable suspicion to beleive he has committed or 
is in the act of commiting or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand his name, address, and an explanation of 
his actions. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Jeffery Glorioso, was charged by information 
with one count of possession with the intent to distribute a 
controlled substance, a second degree felony, pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated 58-37-8(2)(b). On August 8, 1989, a suppression 
hearing was held before the Honorable George E. Ballif, Fourth 
Judicial District Court Judge, and on or about September 8, 1989, 
Judge Ballif denied appellant's motion to suppress. In 
accordance and pursuant to State v. Sery, 758 P. 2d 935 (Utah 
App. Ct. 1988) appellant entered a plea of guilty. On October 
27, 1989, appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate prison 
sentence of one to fifteen years at the Utah State Prison. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
According to the trial transcript on November 15, 1988, 
Trooper Paul Mangleson observed two vehicles, a gray Cheverolet 
Celebrity, and silver Plymouth sedan with Arizona license plates, 
travelling on Interstate 15 in Juab County, State of Utah (Tr. 
21). The first vehicle carried Florida license plates (hereafter 
referred to as the Florida Vehicle), and the second vehicle 
carried Arizona license plates (hereafter referred to as the 
Arizona vehicle (Tr. 51) . However, at the time Trooper Mangleson 
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first observed the Florida vehicle he did not know whether it 
carried Florida license plates or Arizona license plates (Tr. 
51). The vehicles were traveling northbound when Trooper 
Mangleson pulled from the median strip and began to pursue the 
Arizona vehicle. Trooper Mangleson then stopped the Arizona 
vehicle for following to close (Tr. 50). 
Once the Arizona vehicle was stopped, Trooper Mangleson 
requested the driver's license and vehicle registration from the 
driver of the car (Tr. 21) . The driver of the Arizona vehicle 
was Grabrielle Lopez (Tr. 22). There were two other occupants in 
the vehicle, and they identifed themselves as Jose Teran and Jose 
Martinez (Tr. 22.). However, neither Mr. Teran nor Mr. Martinez 
produced any identification (Tr. Pgs. 22 and 53) . Trooper 
Mangleson then searched the Arizona vehicle and found a small 
quantity of marijuana and cocaine. (Tr. 25). Trooper Mangleson 
also found a suitcase in the trunk of the car with the name 
Steven Gregory on it (Tr. 26) . He also found two spare tires in 
the Arizona vehicle. (Tr. 27) . Based on the presence of the 
suitcase and extra spare tire, Trooper Mangleson thought there 
was a good chance that the two vehicles were traveling together 
(Tr. 55). Accordingly, he requested that Trooper Randy Ingerman 
look in the general business area of Nephi for the gray Chevrolet 
Clebrity (Tr. 34-35). Trooper Ingerman looked but did not locate 
the gray vehicle in the general busines area of Nephi (Tr. 35) . 
As Trooper Mangleson was leaving the scene of the stop of 
the Arizona vehicle, he observed the gray Chevrolet vehicle going 
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north on Interstate 15 (Tr. 38) . Trooper Mangleson based on his 
hunch that the two vehicles were traveling together began to 
pursue the gray vehicle and subseqently stopped it. (Tr. 56). 
Prior to the seizure of the Arizona vehicle and Florida vehicle, 
Trooper Mangleson did not know whether the either vehicles were 
four lug or five lug vehicles (Tr. 52). 
Once the Florida vehicle was stopped appellant Glorioso 
produced a valid driver's license and registration (Tr. 41). Mr. 
The passenger in the vehicle then produced his driver's license 
for Trooper Mangleson (Tr. 41) . From that point on appellant was 
detained; he was not free to leave (Tr. 72) . The vehicle was 
then transportated from the roadside to the Juab County Sheriff's 
office where a warrantless search was performed. The search 
revealed approximately one hundred and fifty-three pounds of 
marijuana (Tr. 47). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at the suppression clearly 
established that Trooper Mangleson possessed no reasonable 
suspicion that appellant Glorioso was engaged in any illegal act; 
therefore, the stopping of his automobile and seizing appellant 
based on a "good chance" or "hunch" that the Florida vehicle was 
traveling with the Arizona vehicle is an unconstitutional 
seizure, and all evidence subsequently seized is inadmissible. 
There existed no reasonable suspicion for the continued 
detention of appellant Glorioso after he produced a valid 
driver's license and vehicle registration. Accordingly, the 
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scope of the detention was not reasonably related to reasons 
which may have justified the initial encounter - the location of 
co-defendant Steven Gregory. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INITIAL SEIZURE OF THE DEFENDANT BY TROOPER MANGLESON 
IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL SEIZURE UNDER THE FOURTH AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES CONTITUTION AND THE CONTITUTION 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH BECAUSE THE SEIZURE WAS NOT BASED ON 
SPECIFIC AND ARTICULABLE FACTS WHICH WOULD WARRANT SUCH A SEIZURE 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides the "right of people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. 
U.S. Constitution Amend IV. The Fourth Amendment functions to 
prevent arbitrary and oppressive interference by law enforcement 
officials with the privacy and personal security of individuals. 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54 (1980). 
The Fourth Amendment is implicated in this case because 
stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitutes a 
seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Delaware v. 
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Whenever, a police officer accosts 
an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has 
seized the person, and the Fourth Amendment requires that the 
seizure be reasonable. U.S. v. Berqnoni-Ponce, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 
2578, 422 U.S. 873, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975). 
It is well established that except in those situation where 
there is specific, articulable and reasonable suspicion that a 
motorist is unlicensed or that the automobile is not registered, 
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or that either the occupant or the vehicle is otherwise subject 
to seizure for violation of law, stopping of the automobile and 
detaining its occupant is unreasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment. Delaware v. Prouse, 99 S.Ct. at 1401, and codified in 
this state in Utah Code Ann. Section 77-7-15 (1982). 
The basic rationale for the imposition of the requirement of 
specificity in the information upon which police action is 
predicated is the central teaching of fourth amendment juris-
prudence. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 nl8. It enables a reviewing 
court to assess the reasonableness of the police action against 
an objective standard, not the subjective good faith of the 
individual officer. 
The scheme of the Fourth Amendment becomes 
meaningful only when it is assured that at 
some point the conduct of those charged 
with enforcing the laws can be subjected to 
the more detached, neutral scrutiny of a judge 
who must evaluate the reasonableness of 
a particular search or seizure in light of 
the particular circumstances. And in making 
that assessment it is imperative that the 
facts be judged against an objective standard: 
would the facts available to the officer at 
the moment of the seizure or search "warrant a 
man of reasonable caution in belief" that the 
action taken was appropriate? Anything less 
would invite intrusions upon constitutionally 
guaranteed rights based on nothing less than 
"inarticulate hunches," a result this Court 
has consistently refused to sanction. And 
simple "good faith on the part of the 
arresting officer is not enough.7... If 
subjective good faith alone were the test, 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment would 
evaporate, and the people would be xsecure in 
their'persons, houses, papers and effects,' 
only in the discretion of the police. 
Id at 21-22 (citations and footnotes omitted). 
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Applying the specific, articulable and reasonable suspicion 
standard to the facts of this case/ the court must conclude that 
there exists no specific and articulable facts upon which Trooper 
Mangleson could conclude that the vehicle in which appellant 
Glorioso was traveling in was engaged in illegal activity. At 
the suppression hearing Trooper Mangleson testified that he did 
not stop the vehicle for the purposes of issuing a traffic 
citation. (Tr. 74). Trooper Mangleson seized the defendants 
because he thought there was a "good chance" that the two cars 
were traveling together. (Tr. 65) . The Supreme Court of the 
United States and the Supreme Court of the State of Utah have 
both consistently refused to sanction stops of motorists based on 
hunches. Terry, Id at 21-22, State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 
(Utah 1987), State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
On the day in question there were thousands of cars 
traveling on 1-15. Many of which were in close proximity to the 
Arizona vehicle. At the time of the seizure of appellant 
Glorioso and Mr. Gregory, Trooper Mangleson did not known the 
identites of these two individuals; nor did he have a description 
of Steven James Gregory. Nor did Trooper Mangleson know that 
Steven Gregory was a passenger in the Florida vehicle (Tr. 70). 
He had only a hunch Mr. Gregory was in the vehicle. (Tr. 70) . 
Furthermore, Trooper Mangleson did not know whether either of the 
spare tires belonged to the Florida vehicle. Finally, Trooper 
Mangleson did not even know, at the time of the seizure of 
appellant Glorioso, whether either of the spare tires fit the 
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Arizona vehicle. To sanction the seizure of an automobile simply 
because it travels in close proximity to another vehicle, which 
is involved in illegal activity, without more is an extreme 
expansion of appropriate police behavior. 
Thus, the question in light of the above is whether a 
reasonable officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances 
would have stopped Glorioso because he thought there was a "good 
chance" that the two vehicles were traveling together. The 
answer is obviously no. No reasonable police officer would stop 
one of the thousand of vehicles which travel 1-15 because it 
traveled in close proximity to another vehicle. To sanction such 
a seizure would expose thousands of innocent motorists to the 
physical and psychological intrusion by law enforcement officers 
the Fourth amendment was designed to prevent. Delaware, 99 S.Ct. 
at 1398. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive and often 
necessary mode of transportation. Delaware, Id at 1401. "Many 
people spend more hours each day traveling in their cars than 
walking on the streets. Undoubtedly, many find a greater sense 
of security and privacy in traveling in an automobile than 
exposing themselves by perdestrian or other modes of travel. 
Were individuals subject to unfettered governmental intrusion 
each time he entered an automobile, the security guaranteed by 
the Fourth Amendment would be circumscribed. As Terry v. Ohio, 
recognized, people are not shorn of all Fourth Amendment 
protection when they step from their homes onto the public 
sidewalks. Nor are they shorn of those interests when they step 
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from the sidewalk into their automobiles," Delaware, Id at 1401 
(quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 
L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). 
B. 
WONG SUN DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court has consistently held that evidence 
obtained after an illegal arrest or seizure must be suppressed as 
fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 
U.S. 471 (1963), Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), State v. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (quoting Wong Sun). 
The primary rationale for the exclusionary rule is to 
protect Fourth Amendment guarantees in two respects: in terms of 
deterring lawless conduct by federal officials, and by closing 
the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence 
unconstitutionally obtained evidence. Brown, 95 S.Ct. at 2259. 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. *Its purpose 
is to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only 
effective way possible-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it./lf Brown, Id at 2260 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 
U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (I960)). 
In Brown, Justice Rehnquist stated the clearest indication 
of attentuation is required where official conduct is flagrantly 
abusive of Fourth Amendment rights. Brown, Id at 2265. If, for 
example, as the facts of this case establish, the factors relied 
on by the police in determining to make an arrest were so lacking 
in indicia of probable cause that as to render official belief in 
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its existence entirely unreasonable, or if the evidence indicates 
that the arrest was effectuated as a pretext for collateral 
objectives...1 would require some demonstratively effective break 
in the chain of events leading from the illegal arrest, to the 
statement, such as consultation with counsel or the accused 
presentation before a magistrate for a determination of probable 
cause, before the taint can be deemed removed. Brown, at 2265. 
Because Trooper Mangleson's seizure of appellant Glorioso 
was not based on reasonable suspicion Wong Sun and its progeny 
mandate that all evidence derived from the initial illegality be 
deemed fruit of the poisonous tree and thereby not admissible. 
POINT II 
WHETHER THE SCOPE OF THE DETENTION EXCEEDED THE 
REASONS WHICH GAVE RISE TO THE INITIAL INTERFERENCE 
IN THE FIRST PLACE 
Judge Ballif in his ruling denying appellant's motion to 
suppresss held that once the identity of the Steven James Gregory 
was established the officer had probable cause to arrest 
appellant Glorioso. Judge Ballif's ruling in effect creates new 
law in that the criminal acts of another can be imputed to a 
third party. Additionally, and more importantly his ruling is 
contrary to Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-7-15 which provides 
that a police officer may request the name and address of the 
person. Once Appellant provide this information to Trooper 
Mangleson, appellant was free to go because there existed no 
reason whatsoever to detain him. In United States v. Guzman, 864 
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F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988), the court held that once a person has 
produced a valid driver and proof that he is entitled to operate 
the car he must be allowed to proceed on his way. In this case 
from the point appellant was stopped he was detained and not free 
to leave. (Tr. 72) . The question is what was appellant being 
arrested and detained for? Because no reasons existed for the 
stop and arrest of the appellant all evidence seized from the 
point of the seizure of appellant must be suppressed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence presented at the suppression clearly 
established that Trooper Mangleson did not possess reasonable 
suspicion to believe that appellant was engaged in any illegal 
activity. The seizing of a person based on nothing more than a 
"good chance" or "hunce" is not reasonable suspicion. This court 
therefore should vacate appellant's sentence, and overturn Judge 
Ballif's order denying appellant's motion to suppress. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED AND DATED this £ Vl^ day of July, 
1990. 
Jainfes Esparza ' 
Attorney for Appellant 
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